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ABSTRACT: Van Fraassen (1980) and Winther (2009) claim that we can explain phe-
nomena in terms of scientific theories without believing that they are true. I argue 
that we ought to believe that they are true in order to use them to explain and 
understand phenomena. A scientific antirealist who believes that scientific theories 
are merely empirically adequate cannot use them to explain or to understand pheno-
mena.The mere belief that they are empirically adequate produces neither expla-
nation nor understanding of phenomena. Explanation and understanding are the 
benefits of science only a scientific realist is entitled to.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, scientific realism is defined as the view that successful scien-
tific theories are (approximately) true, and scientific antirealism as the view 
that they are merely empirically adequate. A theory is empirically adequate if 
and only if whatever it says about observables is true. Thus, a realist believes 
what a successful theory says about unobservables and observables, whereas 
an antirealist does not believe what it says about unobservables but believes 
what it says about observables. The issue I want to explore in this paper is 
whether the antirealist can use a scientific theory to explain and understand 
phenomena. I will argue that the belief that an explanatory theory is true is 
built into any coherent act of explaining and understanding phenomena. 
Consequently, the antirealist can neither explain nor understand phenomena 
in terms of scientific theories.
My thesis clashes with what Bas van Fraassen says about acceptance. He 
claims that “acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically 
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adequate” (1980: 12), and that if “the acceptance is at all strong, it is exhib-
ited in the person’s assumption of the role of explainer, in his willingness to 
answer questions ex cathedra” (1980: 12). On van Fraassen’s account, we can 
assume the role of explainer with the mere belief that an explanatory theory 
is empirically adequate. Thus, we can explain phenomena in terms of a sci-
entific theory without believing that it is true. Van Fraassen is not alone on 
this matter.
An instrumentalist believes that a successful scientific theory is useful 
but he does not believe that it is true. Rasmus Winther (2009) asserts that 
the instrumentalist can nonetheless use a scientific theory to explain phe-
nomena:
We are told that there are two attitudes we can take towards a theory: believing 
that it is literally true, or merely believing that it is instrumentally useful for 
predicting, explaining, and intervening. The instrumentalist holds the second 
attitude towards many more theories than the realist. (Winther, 2009: 376)
Note that on Winther’s account of instrumentalism, a scientific theory can 
be instrumentally useful for explaining. His account implies that explanation 
is possible merely on the belief that an explanatory theory is instrumentally 
useful. Thus, explanation is possible without the belief that an explanatory 
theory is true.
Contrary to what van Fraassen and Winther maintain, I will argue that 
we can neither explain nor understand phenomena in terms of scientific 
theories unless we believe that they are true. In Section 2, I will provide an 
example to illustrate that Moore’s Paradox arises when we attempt to ex-
plain and understand phenomena in terms of a scientific theory we do not 
believe. In Section 3, I will argue that the mere belief that a theory is empiri-
cally adequate can generate neither the explanation nor the understanding 
of phenomena. In Section 4, I will expose a psychological problem and an 
ethical problem with the antirealist position that we can explain phenomena 
in terms of a scientific theory without believing that it is true.
2. Moore’s Paradox
2.1. Explainer
Consider, for example, that two pieces of cold metal become hot when rubbed 
together at high speed. Why do they become hot? The kinetic theory of heat 
claims that heat is the mean kinetic energy of molecules, that a material ob-
ject is composed of molecules, and that the friction between the two pieces of 
cold metal causes their constituent molecules to be agitated. In short, the two 
pieces of cold metal become hot because the molecules are agitated. Imagine 
that the antirealist utters the following two sentences:
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(1) The two pieces of the cold metal get hot because the molecules are 
agitated.
(2) But I don’t believe that the molecules are agitated.
The antirealist utters (1) to explain the heat phenomenon, and then he utters 
(2) to be truthful to antirealism. Recall that according to antirealism success-
ful theories are merely empirically adequate. Antirealism prevents him from 
believing that the kinetic theory of heat is true. So he cannot believe that the 
molecules are agitated, and he has to say (2).
It sounds odd, however, to utter (1) and (2) conjointly. To assert both (1) 
and (2) involves Moore’s Paradox. George Moore (1993: 207–212) observes 
that it is absurd to assert a sentence of the form: p, but I do not believe that 
p. This sentence form is exemplified by the consecutive utterances of (1) and 
(2). It is for this reason that I claimed elsewhere (2014a: 12–13) that Moore’s 
Paradox prevents the antirealist from using a scientific theory to explain phe-
nomena. If you want to use a scientific theory to explain phenomena, you 
should believe that it is true.
I am not claiming here that a scientific theory has to be true in order to 
yield an adequate explanation. I am fully aware of the historical fact that false 
theories, such as the Ptolemaic theory, the phlogiston theory, the caloric the-
ory, and the ether theory, were used to explain phenomena. What I contend 
here is rather that past scientists could not coherently explain phenomena in 
terms of the past theories without believing that they were true. Thus, what is 
required for an explanation to be coherent is not the truth of a theory but be-
lief in the truth of the theory. Let me emphasize that my thesis is not refuted 
by the historical fact that false theories adequately explained phenomena.
2.2. Explainee
So far, I have argued that an explainer must believe that the scientific theory 
he invokes is true in order to explain phenomena on its terms. How about 
the explainee? In my view, the explainee must also believe that the theory his 
explainer invokes is true in order to understand phenomena on its terms. The 
explainee cannot understand phenomena in terms of the theory if he does 
not believe that it is true. So I will argue in this section.
Imagine that you observe two pieces of cold metal becoming hot when 
rubbed at high speed. You wonder why that happens. Your epistemic colleague 
gives (1) below as an explanation, but you respond to it by uttering (3):
(1) The two pieces of cold metal are getting hot because the molecules 
are agitated.
(3) I now understand, but I don’t believe that the molecules are agitated.
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You said “I now understand” to express your understanding of the pheno-
menon, and then you said “but I don’t believe that the molecules are agitated” 
to express your commitment to antirealism. It sounds odd, however, to utter 
these two sentences consecutively.
Why is the speech act odd? Consider the sentence ‘I now understand.’ 
Your utterance of it indicates that you formed a new belief as a result of hear-
ing (1). Specifically, after being exposed to the explanation, you formed the 
new belief that the molecules are agitated. Thus, when you assert the sentence 
‘I now understand,’ you indirectly express your new belief that the molecules 
are agitated. Therefore, when you said, “I now understand, but I don’t believe 
that the molecules are agitated,” you indirectly committed Moore’s Paradox.
The preceding example indicates that the belief that molecules are agi-
tated is required to generate the theoretical understanding of why the two 
pieces of cold metal become hot. To generalize, an explainee can gain an 
understanding of a phenomenon in terms of a scientific theory, only if he 
believes that the theory is true. Since the antirealist does not believe that a sci-
entific theory is true, the theoretical understanding of phenomena is beyond 
his cognitive scope. I am contending not that a scientific theory has to be true 
to yield an understanding of phenomena, but that we have to believe that a 
scientific theory is true in order to understand phenomena on its terms.
2.3. Changing the Modes of Speech
In the face of my objection that belief in the truth of a theory is required 
to explain and to understand phenomena on its terms, the antirealist may 
change his modes of speech, replacing (1) with (4):
(1) The two pieces of cold metal are getting hot because the molecules 
are agitated.
(4) The kinetic theory of heat says that the two pieces of cold metal get 
hot because the molecules are agitated.
Note that (4) is not an assertion about the heat phenomenon but an assertion 
about the kinetic theory of heat. When asserting (4), the antirealist is not 
himself explaining the phenomenon in terms of the kinetic theory of heat, 
but is rather reporting an explanation of the phenomenon in terms of the ki-
netic theory of heat. You can report an explanation without believing that it is 
true. Moore’s Paradox is not involved in uttering (4), and then adding, “But I 
don’t believe that the molecules are agitated.” Thus, (4) rescues the antirealist 
from Moore’s Paradox. So it seems.
The fact remains, however, that the antirealist cannot explain the heat 
phenomenon using the kinetic theory of heat because he does not believe 
that it is true. He can at best describe an explanation invoking the kinetic 
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theory of heat, as (4) illustrates. Furthermore, his explainees may ask him a 
disconcerting question: “Do you believe what you reported? In other words, 
do you believe that the two pieces of cold metal get hot because the molecules 
are agitated?” He cannot answer affirmatively because he is an antirealist. 
He cannot answer negatively either because if he does, his explainees would 
discover that he conveyed to them what he did not believe, and hence they 
would refuse to believe what he reported to them (Park 2014b: 138). They 
would ask the antirealist a disturbing question: “Why should we believe what 
you don’t believe?” Since they do not believe what the antirealist reported to 
them, the original puzzle remains. Why do the two pieces of cold metal get 
hot when rubbed at high speed?
If (4) relieves explainees of the puzzle at all, that is because they believe 
that the kinetic theory of heat is true. The explanatory power of (4) derives 
from the belief that the kinetic theory of heat is true. Suppose that the anti-
realist gives you (4) as an explanation, but you respond to him by saying (3):
(3) I now understand, but I don’t believe that the molecules are agitated.
It sounds odd to utter (3) in this context as well. The oddity stems from the 
fact that by saying, “I now understand,” you indirectly say, “The molecules 
are agitated.” Therefore, you also commit Moore’s Paradox when you say (3) 
in this context.
So what? It does not matter whether an explainer uses the mode of speech 
in (1) or the mode of speech in (4). Irrespective of whether the explainer 
explains the heat phenomenon in terms of the kinetic theory of heat or he 
simply reports what the kinetic theory of heat says about the heat phenom-
enon, his explainees form the belief that the molecules are agitated, and this 
new belief is what produces their understanding of the phenomenon. Again, 
you have to believe that an explanatory theory is true in order to understand 
phenomena on its terms.
3. Empirical Adequacy
The antirealist does not believe what a scientific theory says about unobserva-
bles, but he believes what it says about observables, i.e., he believes that it is 
empirically adequate. To use the example of the kinetic theory of heat, the 
antirealist does not believe that the molecules are agitated, but he believes 
that any two pieces of cold metal invariably get hot when rubbed at high 
speed. Within this doxastic framework, the antirealist might give the follow-
ing explanation of why the two pieces of cold metal get hot:
(5) The two pieces of cold metal get hot because any two pieces of cold 
metal invariably get hot when rubbed at high speed.
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(5) should be tempting to the antirealist because it matches up with his belief 
that the kinetic theory of heat is merely empirically adequate, and because he 
does not commit Moore’s Paradox, even if he adds that he does not believe 
that molecules are agitated after uttering (5).
Two comments about (5) are in order. First, (5) is not a theoretical ex-
planation but an observational explanation. In a theoretical explanation, an 
observable event is explained in terms of at least one theoretical event. (1) is 
an example of a theoretical explanation because it is a theoretical event that 
molecules are agitated. In an observational explanation, an observable event 
is explained exclusively in terms of observable events. Therefore, even if (5) is 
a tenable explanation, it is only an observational explanation, and the thesis 
stands that a theoretical explanation is beyond the antirealist’s reach.
Second, it is not clear whether (5) is a tenable observational explanation 
or not. Of course, some observational explanations are legitimate. For ex-
ample, the traffic accident occurred yesterday because the driver was drunk. 
(5), however, is not similar to such a legitimate observational explanation. As 
Alan Musgrave (1988: 242) points out, it is rather analogous to the dubious 
observational explanation that a swan is white because all swans are white. It 
is absurd in general to explain an event in terms of another event temporally 
posterior to it. Imagine that the first swan was born in the distant past, and 
that it was white. Why was the first swan white? To say that it was white be-
cause all swans are white amounts to saying that it was white because all the 
swans to be born later would be white. Such an explanation is absurd.
Similarly, imagine that Count Rumford, the proponent of the kinetic 
theory of heat, rubbed two pieces of cold metal for the first time ever. He was 
puzzled over why they got hot. The antirealist came along and said, “They 
got hot because any two pieces of cold metal invariably get hot when rubbed 
at high speed.” To say so is to explain an event in terms of the events tempo-
rally posterior to it because by hypothesis no one rubbed two pieces of cold 
metal before Rumford. For this reason, belief in the empirical adequacy of 
the kinetic theory of heat cannot generate an adequate explanation of the first 
occurrence of the heat phenomenon.
The problem of explaining the first event in a domain should not be un-
derestimated. There were many times in the history of science when scientists 
discovered new phenomena by using then the state-of-the-art instruments, 
such as electron microscopes and particle accelerators. If they believed that 
their theories are merely empirically adequate, they could not explain the 
phenomena because the phenomena occurred for the first time with the help 
of the state-of-the-art instruments.
Jerrett Leplin (1997) goes further, arguing that a generalization does not 
explain its instance regardless of whether the instance is the first event or not 
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because the generalization needs to be explained in terms of theoretical enti-
ties. For example, the generalization that all swans are white does not explain 
why a swan is white because the color of all the swans needs to be explained 
in terms of an underlying structure or a deeper principle:
Generalizations do not explain their instances. On the contrary, the apparent 
satisfaction of a generalization is more remarkable, and more an inducement 
to seek an underlying structure or a deeper principle, than the individual case. 
(Leplin, 1997: 23)
Thus, we need to explain why any two pieces of cold metal invariably get hot 
when rubbed at high speed by appealing to the underlying structure of the 
pieces of cold metal. We can do this by invoking the kinetic theory of heat.
Leplin’s argument, however, is vulnerable to van Fraassen’s critical response 
that a generalization is a brute fact, i.e., it does not cry out for an explanation. 
We do not need to explain a generalization in terms of theoretical entities:
So here the anti-realist must similarly say: that the observable phenomena ex-
hibit these regularities, because of which they fit the theory, is merely a brute 
fact, and may or may not have an explanation in terms of unobservable facts 
‘behind the phenomena’ – it really does not matter to the goodness of the the-
ory, nor to our understanding of the world. (van Fraassen 1980: 24)
On van Fraassen’s account, it is a brute fact that any two pieces of cold metal 
invariably get hot when rubbed at high speed. There might be a theoretical 
explanationof the generalization. Such an explanation, however, is not neces-
sary for our understanding of the world.
It is not clear, however, why a generalization does not cry out for an 
explanation when an instance does. After all, the generalization is nothing 
but a collection of instances similar to the original instance which cried out 
for an explanation. If the color of a swan is a mystery, so is the color of all 
the swans. To say that a swan is white because all swans are white is merely 
to replace a mystery with the set of all the mysteries similar to it. You cannot 
solve a mystery by providing a set of all the mysteries similar to it. It is not the 
case that if all the similar mysteries are taken together, they cancel out each 
other, and that as a result the original mystery evaporates. On the contrary, 
all the mysteries considered together will only intensify the original mystery. 
For this reason, (5) is a vacuous explanation.
Relatedly, it is circular to explain an instance in terms of its generaliza-
tion. To simplify the matter, imagine that there are only two swans in the 
world, and that they are both white. The color of each swan is explained as 
follows:
(E1) Swan1 is white because swan1 and swan2 are white.
(E2) Swan2 is white because swan1 and swan2 are white.
286 Prolegomena 13 (2) 2014
Note that (E1) and (E2) are saying that swan1 is white because swan2 is white, 
and that swan2 is white because swan1 is white. Such explanations are circular, 
casting no light on why swan1 is white and why swan2 is white. It is for this 
reason, I believe, that Musgrave (1988), Leplin (1997: 23), and Park (2014a: 
14) claim that a generalization does not explain its instance. It is vacuous to 
say that some swans are white because all swans are white.
The problem of circularity does not arise, if the explanans differs radi-
cally from the explanandum. You can solve a mystery by referring to another 
mystery, if they are different in kind. For example, it is justifiable to explain 
the color of a swan in terms of the photons of certain wave lengths bounced 
off from the swan. Of course, it is a mystery why the photons of the wave-
lengths produce the white color. But it is not circular to provide such a mys-
tery to solve the original mystery.
We have to distinguish between being relieved of a puzzle in science and 
being relieved of a worry in ethics. Imagine that you are invited to a dinner 
in a foreign country. To your embarrassment, you belch after the dinner. You 
worry about your behavior. To your relief, however, your host tells you that in 
that country all people belch after a meal. As a result, you are relieved of the 
worry. The point of this story is that you no longer worry about your behav-
ior, once you are told that all behave as you do. The word ‘all’ has such psy-
chological power. The power is erroneously transferred from ethics to science. 
You are puzzled over why a swan is white. Once you are told that all swans are 
white, you tend to stop puzzling over the color of the swan. You are tempted 
to think that the color of the swan is explained, and that it is a brute fact that 
all swans are white. On close examination, however, the color of the swan is 
not explained at all, and it is not a brute fact that all swans are white.
4. As-If-Realist
The antirealist may argue that he can explain something merely as if he is a 
realist. He does not believe that the molecules are agitated, but he speaks like 
the realist, “The two pieces of cold metal are getting hot because the mol-
ecules are agitated.” When asked whether he believes that the molecules are 
agitated, he also speaks like the realist,“Yes, I believe that the molecules are 
agitated.” Thus, the antirealist is verbally indistinguishable from the realist. 
Such an antirealist might be called a doxastic antirealist but verbal realist. He 
is an antirealist from a doxastic pointof view, but a realist from a verbal point 
of view. He does not commit Moore’s Paradox because he does not say, “I 
don’t believe the molecules are agitated.”
Is it plausible that we can be doxastic antirealists but verbal realists? I ear-
lier argued that belief is a prior condition for enlightenment, i.e., we have to 
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believe that an explanatory theory is true in order to understand phenomena 
on its terms. In my view, when the antirealist explains phenomena merely as 
if he is a realist, he does not understand why the phenomena occur. He has 
no idea why the two pieces of cold metal are getting hot, and yet he says that 
they are getting hot because the molecules are agitated. His explainees may 
ask him a perplexing question: “Do you understand why the two pieces of 
cold metal are getting hot?” Of course, he would say yes because he is a ver-
bal realist. But his answer is not an honest one. Thus, the antirealist merely 
exchanged Moore’s Paradox with dishonesty.
In addition, the antirealist suffers from what psychologists call cognitive 
dissonance. Leon Festinger and James Carlsmith (1959) argue that if we say 
something contrary to what we believe, we experience a kind of psychological 
discomfort called cognitive dissonance. For example, after performing tedious 
tasks, we form the belief that the tasks were tedious. Suppose, however, that 
we are offered a monetary reward on condition we answer affirmatively to the 
question: Were the tasks interesting? We say yes and go through cognitive dis-
sonance. We even tend to replace the previous belief with the new belief that 
the tasks were interesting, thereby returning to cognitive consonance:
If a person is induced to do or say something which is contrary to his private 
opinion, there will be a tendency for him to change his opinion so as to bring 
it into correspondence with what he has done or said. (Festinger and Carlsmith 
1959: 209)
Festinger and Carlsmith’s psychological finding has an interesting implica-
tion on antirealism. The antirealist experiences cognitive dissonance when 
he explains phenomena merely as if he is a realist. His cognitive dissonance 
culminates when he answers the question: “Do you understand why the phe-
nomena occur?” Furthermore, he is likely to become a realist as he speaks like 
a realist. Therefore, it may be logically possible but psychologically unrealistic 
that we can be doxastic antirealists but verbal realists.
In addition to the psychological problem, there is an ethical problem 
with explaining something without believing that an explanatory theory is 
true. The antirealist does not believe that the molecules are agitated, but he 
says, “The two pieces of cold metal are getting hot because the molecules are 
agitated.” His innocent explainees would take his explanation literally, think-
ing that he believes that the kinetic theory of heat is true. As a result, they 
would believe that the kinetic theory of heat is true, and they would believe 
more than what the antirealist believes. Thus, the antirealist’s speech act is 
epistemically irresponsible with respect to his unsuspecting explainees.
I offered an example elsewhere (2014b: 137) to show that it is unethical 
to explain phenomena in terms of a theory without believing that it is true. 
Imagine that you are a member of a cult, and that you wonder why complex 
288 Prolegomena 13 (2) 2014
things exist in the world. Your cult leader says, “Only an intelligent designer 
can create the complex things. My god is infinitely intelligent. He created 
all the complex things in the world.” Persuaded of his explanation, you be-
come his fervent follower and donate all of your money to him. It turns out, 
however, that he did not believe that the god exists. He merely spoke as if 
he believed that the god exists. From a verbal point of view, he was a theist, 
but from a doxastic point of view, he was an atheist! In such a situation, you 
would think that his speech act was unethical, and that he should not have 
talked as if he believed that the god exists.
What if the antirealist’s explainees know that the antirealist speaks merely 
as if he is a realist? They may treat him in the way he treated them. When he 
says that the two pieces of cold metal are getting hot because the molecules 
are agitated, they refuse to believe that the molecules are agitated on the 
grounds that he himself does not believe that the molecules are agitated. So 
they still do not understand why the two pieces of cold metal are getting hot. 
But they say to the explainer that they now understand why the two pieces 
of cold metal are getting hot. As they say so, the antirealist feels rewarded, 
thinking that he enlightened them on the phenomena. In reality, however, 
they still do not understand why the phenomena occur. They are speaking 
merely as if they are enlightened on the phenomena. Their language mis-
leads the antirealist exactly as the antirealist’s language misleads unsuspecting 
explainees. In short, the antirealist cannot convince anyone of the truth of 
his explanation and hence he cannot enlighten anyone, if his epistemic col-
leagues treat him in the way he treats them. In addition, he will be deceived 
by his epistemic colleagues in return for deceiving them.
5. Implication
So far I argued that it is problematic to explain phenomena in terms of a 
theory without believing that it is true. How is this thesis related to the cel-
ebrated theories of scientific explanation in the literature? Roughly speaking, 
Carl Hempel’s deductive-nomological model (1966: Chapter 5) holds that 
to explain an explanandum is to deduce it from explanantia which include a 
law of nature. Michel Friedman’s (1974) and Philip Kitcher’s (1981) unifica-
tory theory maintains that to explain phenomena is to unify them. Wesley 
Salmon’s causal theory (1978) asserts that to explain phenomena essentially 
involves identifying causes. Bas van Fraassen’s contextual theory (1980: Chap-
ter 5) claims that an explanation is an answer to a why-question, and that the 
appropriateness of the answer depends on context. None of these theories 
addresses the doxastic aspect of explanation, although belief in the truth of 
explanantia is an important condition for an explanation to be adequate from 
psychological and ethical points of view.
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6. Conclusion
Moore’s Paradox arises when we explain and understand phenomena in terms 
of scientific theories without believing that they are true. The antirealist does 
not believe that a scientific theory is true. So he can neither explain nor 
understand puzzling phenomena around us in terms of scientific theories. 
In general, it is circular to explain an instance in terms of its generalization. 
So the mere belief that a theory is empirically adequate can generate neither 
explanation nor understanding of phenomena in its domain. The theoretical 
explanations and understandings of phenomena are the benefits of science 
only the realist is entitled to.
The antirealist may contend that he can speak merely as if he is a realist. 
I replied that the antirealist cannot understand himself why an explanan-
dum occurs, that it is psychologically unrealistic that the antirealist can speak 
merely as if he is a realist, that it is unethical to explain phenomena in terms 
of a theory without believing that it is true, and that the antirealist cannot 
enlighten his explainees on phenomena if they treat him in the way he treats 
them. Antirealism is not an epistemic policy recommendable to those who 
are interested in explaining or understanding phenomena in terms of scien-
tific theories.
Finally, I must emphasize again that the main thesis of this paper is re-
futed not when it is shown that a false theory adequately explains phenomena 
but when it is shown that we can coherently explain phenomena in terms 
of a theory without believing that it is true. It is a misguided criticism that 
many false theories adequately explained phenomena in the history of sci-
ence. The past theories do not count as counterexamples to the main thesis 
of this paper.1
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